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Abstract 
Using two published accounts of teaching experience 
in Women’s Studies classrooms by way of illustration, 
I argue that seeing privilege through three lenses—as 
something one has, something one is, and something 
one does—can assist feminist educators in meeting di-
verse goals in their anti-oppression classrooms as they 
continue to grapple with the messy and often contradic-
tory challenges of privilege.
Résumé
Selon deux récits publiés sur des expériences d’ensei-
gnement dans les cours d’études des femmes à titre 
d’illustration, je fais valoir que le fait de considérer le 
privilège sous trois aspects—soit quelque chose que l’on 
a, quelque chose que l’on est et quelque chose que l’on 
fait—peut aider les éducateurs féministes à répondre 
à différents objectifs dans leurs cours anti-oppression 
alors qu’ils continuent à faire face aux défis embrouillés 
et parfois contradictoires que pose le privilège. 
Introduction
 Coinciding with an enormous reorientation in 
feminist scholarship toward intersectionality and multi-
ple sites of difference and power (see Davis 2008), privi-
lege has become a central concept in feminist academic 
circles. Scholars, like Peggy McIntosh (2012), have pro-
vided seminal contributions to an increasingly robust 
literature in “privilege studies” that connects Women’s 
and Gender Studies with anti-oppression work in oth-
er diverse disciplines. As feminist educators, teaching 
students about privilege is necessary, but not enough. 
We also routinely encounter the effects of privilege as it 
operates in our classrooms and among our students, but 
responding to the challenges created by privilege is far 
from a simple pedagogical task. Our ideas about what 
privilege is are varied, and the stories we tell and the 
conclusions we draw are different because of the often 
unspoken assumptions embedded in our understand-
ings of privilege. These contradictions and imprecisions 
often become most visible in teaching, where our prac-
tice must meet the unpredictability of our students. In 
one striking example, Mary Bryson and Suzanne de 
Castell (1993) and Jen Bacon (2006) published accounts 
exploring the problems and challenges that emerged 
from workings of privilege in their two Women’s Studies 
courses. Both sets of instructors intended to engage stu-
dents in anti-essentialist and poststructural approaches 
to sexual identity. Despite similar goals, Bryson and de 
Castell thought that privilege prevented some students 
from engaging in their project, while Bacon thought 
that it aided some students in doing so. These exam-
ples suggest that despite the pervasiveness of privilege 
across contexts, its effects can often be uncertain and 
even contradictory. 
 In this paper, I begin by examining the class-
room experiences described by Bryson and de Castell 
(1993) and Bacon (2006), and the very different conclu-
sions they drew about privilege based on their attempts 
to queer their Women’s Studies courses. I then outline 
three lenses that educators can use to understand priv-
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ilege—as something we have, something we are, and 
something we do, which I argue encourage us to look 
at privilege in different ways in our day-to-day practice. 
To demonstrate the features of these lenses and their 
applicability to anti-oppression educational practice, I 
apply them to each of Kevin Kumashiro’s (2002) four 
approaches to anti-oppression education. Having ex-
plored the relevance of these three lenses of privilege for 
varied classroom goals, I finally apply the three lenses 
to Bryson and de Castell’s and Bacon’s analyses of their 
two queer-focused Women’s Studies classrooms to illus-
trate how they can broaden the questions we ask about 
privilege in our teaching practice and refocus our atten-
tion on the choices we are making and the goals we have 
as educators.
Contradictory Conclusions in Two Women’s Studies 
Classrooms
 Separated by an international border and more 
than a decade, Bryson and de Castell (1993) and Bacon 
(2006) wrote about their experiences with privilege in 
their respective Women’s Studies classrooms. Despite 
having very closely related goals in their two cours-
es on lesbian studies, their respective analyses of the 
effects of privilege in their classrooms came to nearly 
opposite conclusions. In this section, I introduce these 
two accounts in order to demonstrate that the prob-
lems privilege creates in our classrooms can be messy 
and even contradictory.
 Bryson and de Castell (1993) examined priv-
ilege in the context of their Women’s Studies course 
called “Lesbian Subjects Matter: Feminism/s from 
the Margins?,” which they taught in 1991 at a “major 
urban Canadian university” (288). In doing so, they 
asked two main questions: “First, we asked whether 
the claiming of cultural representation and voice nec-
essarily entails the inevitability of essentialism”; and 
“Second, we questioned whether a politics of iden-
tity—especially an identity constructed ‘on the mar-
gins’—could be a viable strategy, either theoretically 
or politically” (289). In theoretical terms, the course 
addressed issues related to essentialism, identity frag-
mentation, and the politics of identity (288). In prac-
tical terms, students examined a series of “texts” and 
heard in-class guest presentations by diverse “lesbian 
subjects” (289). Given training in various audio-visual 
technologies of the day, students were asked to under-
take a project “exploring some aspect of lesbian iden-
tity/representation and making use of any appropriate 
technology” (289). Other required tasks included pre-
senting their description of a hypothetical meeting be-
tween two famous lesbians (290) and producing their 
own journals (291).
 Bryson and de Castell (1993) explained that 
they tried to use queer pedagogy “deliberately to inter-
fere with, or intervene in, the production of ‘normalcy’ 
in schooled subjects” (285), but were disappointed with 
the results. They found that “white students who iden-
tified as heterosexual made, for example, lifeless pre-
sentations ‘about lesbians’ that bore painful testimony 
to their inability to imagine an encounter between, say, 
Audre Lorde and Mary Daly” (291). They also observed 
that, in class, their white heterosexual students mostly 
“‘passed’ as lesbian” and stayed silent (292). The authors 
soon realised that “in selectively focusing on lesbian-
ism as a site for the construction of difference/s,” they 
“had created an us/them structure” that prevented col-
laboration in exploring difference, even though such an 
exploration had been their intention (292). In the end, 
nearly all of their heterosexual students wrote “standard 
essays, created individually and produced on word pro-
cessors in print form” that dealt with “topics of identity 
and difference by means of a critique of the heterosex-
ism of institutional knowledges, such as other wom-
en’s studies courses” (292). The authors believed that, 
for most of the straight-identified students in the class, 
the texts in question and the identity of lesbian became 
objects of distant inquiry and study, even though the 
instructors had explicitly warned against such an ap-
proach throughout the course (291).
 As Bryson and de Castell (1993) further doc-
umented, only one heterosexual student, “a woman of 
colour” (292), joined the many lesbian and bisexual 
students who engaged thoughtfully and used various 
media in ways that meaningfully challenged the tradi-
tional “division of labour in classroom tasks,” “power re-
lations,” and “received knowledges” (293). In short, the 
authors found that,
students usually given the space, voice, and liberty to 
speak and to be heard ended up in this course reverting 
to tepid, formulaic, disengaged essays, while students ‘of 
difference’ took permission to play with form, genre, sub-
stance, and personal/political purposes, and produced 
what was undeniably outstanding, innovative, and, above 
all, engaged work. (293)
Due to the effects of privilege in their classroom, Bryson 
and de Castell indicated that all the energy of the class 
was used to deal with the discomfort of the heterosex-
ual students (294).  Based on their observations in this 
classroom, they came to the conclusion “that lesbian-
ism, although it could of course be any other subor-
dinated identity, is always marginal…and that lesbian 
identity is always fixed and stable, even in a course that 
explicitly critiques, challenges, deconstructs ‘lesbian 
identity’” (294). 
 Bacon (2006) taught her Women’s Studies 
course, entitled “Lesbian Studies” (270), with similar 
intentions, but with a different approach. As a new fac-
ulty member asked to teach the course for the first time, 
her goal was to disrupt identity fixity. She explained 
that she somewhat naively “assumed a Lesbian Studies 
course would be an interrogation of the category ‘les-
bian’” (271). Unlike Bryson and de Castell, Bacon did 
not provide details about the assignments students were 
asked to tackle in the course and their reactions to them, 
but rather focused on her classroom approach and the 
progress of the class discussions.
 Bacon (2006) began the course by sharing a 
standard “coming out narrative” based on her own ex-
periences to which the students responded positive-
ly (272). At the outset, she found that both straight 
and lesbian students were comforted by the fixed and 
clear representation of lesbians about whom they 
could learn. Yet, this was just the beginning, as she 
explained:
In my classroom, I begin the semester presenting an iden-
tity that is static…I inhabit, and perform, a lesbian body. 
But as the course continues, the provisional and fluid 
identities…are going to appear, and it’s my job to make 
that overt and explicit for my students. (276)
Over time, then, Bacon intentionally performed “alter-
nate versions” of her “coming out story” that showed 
lesbian identity as much more fluid and uncertain than 
her initial story (276). This gave her an opportunity to 
lead the class through contentious, but illuminating, 
discussions about power and identity and the role that 
privilege plays, for example, in disagreements over bi-
sexuality (276-277). 
 While Bryson and de Castell (1993) found that 
it was the privileged straight students who resisted their 
attempts to queer the classroom, Bacon (2006) observed 
that her straight-identified students got her deconstruc-
tionist approach first (276) and her marginalised les-
bian students were the ones who were most resistant 
to the project. By way of explanation, she highlighted 
the tension between “the LGBT classroom” where such 
students “might just get what they’re looking for” and 
“the queer classroom” where “this can be more diffi-
cult” (276). For lesbian-identified students, she noted, 
this was often their first time away from home and their 
first real opportunity to meet others with the same or 
similar identities. She also believed that they enrolled 
in a Lesbian Studies course because they were seeking 
to understand their own fixed identity and were not 
looking to unfix it. They were also seeking institutional 
legitimation. While heterosexually-identified students 
already experienced the privilege of legitimacy, those 
who did not understandably resisted attempts to desta-
bilise what they had worked so hard to legitimise. “Our 
students want to be normal, too,” she stated, “because 
it is a measure of privilege to be able to shun the nor-
mal—to queer the categories of our lives for the delight 
of pushing our politics further than our bodies might 
readily go” (279). Thus, Bacon believed that some mea-
sure of privilege, and the security that comes with it, 
was a kind of asset for queer learners in her classroom.
While these three instructors aimed to destabi-
lise rigid identity categories in their classrooms, their 
observations and conclusions about privilege and iden-
tity and the problems privilege posed in their teaching 
were starkly different. This comparison, of course, is not 
perfect. It is not possible to know exactly what happened 
in these classrooms or what queer pedagogy meant to 
each instructor. Queer theory also changed significantly 
between 1993 and 2006, as did societal attitudes toward 
sexual identity in Canada and the United States. Yet the 
comparison illustrates the significant extent to which 
privilege can have unpredictable and even contradicto-
ry effects on the pursuit of our teaching goals.
Three Lenses: Privilege as Having, Being, and Doing
  To respond to these sorts of contradictions, I 
suggest a theoretical model that allows us to see priv-
ilege through three different lenses: as something we 
have, something we are, and something we do.
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Privilege as Having
 The first lens sees privilege as something we 
have. Linda L. Black and David Stone (2005) state that 
scholars tend to agree that privilege is “a special advan-
tage” that “is granted, not earned,” and “is a right or en-
titlement that is related to a preferred status or rank” 
(244). They note that “privilege is exercised for the ben-
efit of the recipient and to the exclusion or detriment 
of others” and “is often outside of the awareness of the 
person possessing it” (244).  
 Black and Stone’s definition begins to illuminate 
the ways in which privilege is thought of as a thing, sub-
stance, or entity. Adam Howard (2008) has characterised 
early scholarly understandings of privilege as follows:
what might be called the ‘first generation’ scholars have 
constructed commodified notions of privilege. Privilege, in 
other words, has been understood extrinsically, as some-
thing individuals have or possess…or something they 
experience, rather than as something more intrinsic, as 
something that reveals who they are or who they have be-
come in a fundamental sense. (23)
It is unclear whether Black and Stone’s (2005) definition 
is consistent with such a commodified notion, though 
their description of a “special advantage” that can be 
“exercised” (244) suggests it could be. Nevertheless, the 
concept of privilege as a possession can be useful for 
conceiving of the sum of resources that some have, but 
others do not. For example, Howard (2008) describes 
his early school experiences as the child of parents with 
mental and physical illnesses living in poverty:
Ignoring the fact that most adults in our community could 
barely read or write, the school, even at the kindergarten 
level, expected us to be able, for example, to recite the al-
phabet, count up to a certain point, be able to write our 
names, and hold books the right way. Although my par-
ents had a higher level of literacy than most in the com-
munity…they did not read to us and did not spend time 
with us rehearsing the alphabet or teaching us our num-
bers…they taught us different lessons about life that come 
from living in poverty. These learning experiences had no 
value in transitioning to formal schooling. (x)
Considering Howard’s story through a possession lens 
highlights how students living in poverty were not giv-
en the preparation consistent with the expectations of 
the schooling system that was available to more affluent 
students. This lens sees privilege as something that is 
bestowed on a person or taken by them.
 Thinking about privilege as something one has, 
then, can be useful for identifying particular advantag-
es held by some and not by others. There is something 
eminently practical about such a conception. There 
are, however, limitations to the possession lens, which 
assumes that privilege functions largely as an external 
object and is similarly applicable in all contexts. In the 
latter case, it cannot account for the fact that a status 
that privileges a person in one setting might prove to be 
of no use, or even to be a disadvantage, in another set-
ting. For example, a gay-identified white man may have 
privilege in certain queer communities, but he might 
not in a particular professional sports team. Thus, the 
possession lens does not draw attention to the multi-
ple intersecting ways in which different identities and 
settings can interact to produce both privileged and op-
pressed statuses. Also, privilege understood as a posses-
sion does not address any interaction between privilege 
and other factors in one’s life and circumstances, such as 
one’s notion of self or views on the world. It implies that 
privilege is its own discrete entity that is fundamentally 
distinct from its context.
Privilege as Being
 Despite its usefulness in conceptualising some 
situations, scholars have challenged seeing privilege 
simply as something one has. Howard (2008), in his 
study of affluent students in private and public schools, 
explicitly breaks with earlier definitions of privilege as 
possession, instead advocating for a notion of “privilege 
as identity” (23):
As an identity (or an aspect of identity), privilege is a lens 
through which an individual understands self and self in 
relation to others…Social systems function in ways that 
support and validate the social construction of a privi-
leged identity for some while limiting and discouraging its 
construction for others. (23)
In his view, privilege is a part of identity formation. 
Howard notes that “[a]lthough there is an important 
connection between what advantages individuals have 
and their identity (that is, how their advantages in life 
fashion a particular sense of the self),” he also aims to 
“situate privilege in a more comprehensive framework 
by exploring the process by which privilege is con-
structed and reconstructed as an identity” (23). How-
ard’s work suggests a lens through which privilege is 
seen as not simply a matter of having, but rather a mat-
ter of being.  
 Providing an example related to his own school-
ing experience, Howard (2008) explains how the incom-
patibility between his school’s expectations of his aca-
demic preparation and the reality of his life, as described 
above, resulted in his illiteracy and in teachers assuming 
he was a weak student (xii–xiii). While Howard’s story 
indicates that privilege encompasses particular advan-
tages or experiences that one has, it can also show privi-
lege to be a matter of something one is and what one has 
become through institutional and structural processes.
 The conceptualisation of privilege as being has 
certain advantages over privilege as having, in that it 
accounts for the interaction between privilege and the 
self. Howard’s analysis suggests that privilege is related 
to how one sees oneself and that this interrelationship 
is shaped and negotiated through one’s ongoing expe-
riences. This creates space to identify and critique the 
ways in which privileged identities are formed, which 
suggests that perhaps lasting interventions into priv-
ileged identity formation, and therefore privilege, are 
possible across situations and contexts. The lens of priv-
ilege as being also creates space for understanding the 
connections between privileged identities and the insti-
tutional and structural processes that create and rein-
force them, including educational institutions (see, for 
example, Tisdell 1993). 
There are also disadvantages to seeing privilege 
as being. Like privilege as having, it does not adequate-
ly address the multitude of ways in which privilege is 
situated, contextual, and enacted in particular locations 
and moments. While Howard’s (2008) analysis is cer-
tainly compatible with these observations, thinking 
about privilege as something one is suggests more sta-
bility than reality often allows. Contextual factors can 
play a significant role in the operation of privilege in 
particular moments. In the classroom, for example, this 
might involve the extent to which a student identifies 
intellectually or personally with either the instructor(s) 
or other students. The focus, then, on privileged iden-
tities instead of on contextual, situated privilege may 
unnecessarily limit efforts to minimise the workings of 
privilege of some over others in particular contexts and 
institutional locations. While the integrated, overarch-
ing lens of privilege as being has the potential for sys-
temic change outlined above, it also limits attention to 
the ways in which privilege in particular settings should 
be considered or mitigated.
Privilege as Doing
 There are some advantages, then, to thinking 
about privilege as something one has and something 
one is, but neither accounts well for the situated opera-
tion of privilege. For this, we need a conceptualisation 
of privilege as something one does. Working in a post-
structuralist tradition, Kevin Kumashiro (2002) argues 
that “being privileged requires that a person thinks, 
feels, acts, and relates to others in only particular ways; 
it requires that a person be identified by others in only 
particular ways” (156). In this understanding, one must 
“constantly become,” for example, “privileged as mascu-
line” and one can never fully be it; such privilege re-
quires constant testing and proving of one’s masculinity 
and lack of femininity (156). Privilege, then, is some-
thing we must continually do.
 It is important to note that Kumashiro (2002) 
and Howard (2008) are by no means incompatible in 
their approaches. They both acknowledge situated 
experiences and processes as crucial to the workings 
of both privilege and oppression. It is perhaps most 
accurate to say that their focuses are different: How-
ard concentrates on the creation of particular identi-
ties in certain structural contexts, while Kumashiro 
considers the operation of oppression in situated mo-
ments. These are related, but it can be useful to dif-
ferentiate between the two, as they potentially have 
different implications.
 Seeing privilege as something one does allows 
for detailed attention to the ways in which privilege is 
created, acted out, and contested. It also emphasises a 
situated understanding of privilege, which, as the rest of 
Kumashiro’s (2002) work suggests, can illuminate con-
tradictory and contested ways of knowing and being. 
This conceptualisation is not, however, complete. Little 
can be said about systemic privilege using this lens, and 
by itself, it is limited in its ability to critique broader 
structural environments that lead to very different lev-
els of privilege across contexts. It also lacks the benefit 
of seeing privilege as a possession, which can at times 
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provide us with the ability to see the concrete advantag-
es that a person has in a particular situation or setting.
 It is clear, then, that these three ways of con-
ceptualizing privilege—as  having, being, and doing—
all have distinct advantages and disadvantages, but we 
need them all in order to deal with privilege in theory 
and in practice. People can “have” privilege. They are 
also affected by the ways in which they “are” privilege 
and the ways in which privilege helps to constitute their 
identities. Lastly, they can “do” privilege as they create, 
recreate, and constantly negotiate privilege through dis-
courses and situated interactions. 
Having, Being, and Doing Privilege in Anti-Oppres-
sion Classrooms
 In this section, I seek to flesh out the features of 
the three lenses pertaining to understanding privilege 
and to demonstrate that they are applicable to the prac-
tical concerns and goals of anti-oppression educators. 
As Jennifer M. Gore (1993) has noted, the Women’s 
Studies literature on feminist pedagogy has a long his-
tory of attentiveness to classroom practice. In keeping 
with this tradition, I apply the three lenses to some of 
the ways that feminist and other anti-oppression educa-
tors actually do anti-oppression education. 
 Kumashiro’s (2002) work on approaches to an-
ti-oppression education is ideally suited to this purpose 
for two reasons. First, Kumashiro is sharply focused 
on what educators do in the classroom and the goals 
they pursue, and not just on the theories underpinning 
their broader commitment to social justice. Second, he 
connects these practices and goals to relevant theories 
of oppression, which allows us to more thoroughly ex-
amine the connections between those theories and the 
three lenses of privilege. In short, Kumashiro’s work al-
lows me to connect the three lenses to theories of op-
pression and to the details of practice. In the following 
discussion, then, I examine his four anti-oppression 
education approaches through the three lenses of hav-
ing, being, and doing privilege in order to expand on 
the theory behind these lenses and to show their ap-
plicability to practice in feminist classrooms. Kumashi-
ro’s four approaches include “education for the Other, 
education about the Other, education that is critical of 
privileging and Othering, and education that changes 
students and society” (31). 
Education for the Other
 Education for the Other focuses on the needs 
of those who are marginalised or harmed in  educa-
tional settings through such means as direct violence 
and harmful assumptions made by peers and educators 
(Kumashiro 2002, 33-34). This approach suggests that 
schools must be transformed into safe spaces for all 
students and that students who experience oppression 
must be given particular spaces that provide both safety 
and resources (34-35). Kumashiro sees strength in this 
approach because it draws the attention of educators 
and institutions to the problems of oppression within 
educational settings, highlights the diversity of students 
within schools, and focuses on student needs that are 
not being met (36-37). One weakness he identifies is 
the practical difficulty associated with defining margin-
alised groups and assessing their specific needs. He also 
maintains that this approach does not adequately take 
multiple sites of oppression into account  (37-39). It also 
focuses on the Other as the problem and ignores the 
fact that “Oppression consists not only of the margin-
alizing of the Other; it also consists of the privileging 
of the ‘normal’” (37). Kumashiro notes that privilege is 
largely left out of this approach, as the focus is placed 
solidly on the Other and not on those against whom the 
Other is juxtaposed (37).  
 Though education for the Other does not seem 
to leave much space to consider privilege at all, it is 
most closely connected to seeing privilege as something 
one has. Within a particular classroom, education for 
the Other asks educators to work to identify and meet 
the needs of marginalised students, particularly with 
regard to harm to, and assumptions about, the Other. 
In this way, privilege is potentially visible as the norm 
from which oppressed students are excluded by the un-
fairness of the educational system. This approach seeks 
to compensate for privilege, by giving Othered students 
resources and by trying to keep teachers and other stu-
dents from taking their resources away through insen-
sitive or abusive behaviour.
 While education for the Other does not focus 
on privilege, this should not be considered solely as a 
disadvantage. While privilege must certainly be a con-
sideration in the anti-oppression classroom, an overem-
phasis on privilege, and those who have it, can result in 
insufficient attention being paid to the needs of those 
who are Othered. This approach demands concern for 
the needs of the Other and, in this way, the absence of 
attention to privilege can have its uses as well.
Education About the Other
 Education about the Other sees oppression as 
growing out of “partial” knowledge about  the Other, 
which is “based on stereotypes and myths” (Kumashiro 
2002, 40). Since the problem is ignorance, the goal of the 
educator should be to make student knowledge more 
complete by providing information about the Other, 
both in individual lessons or workshops and through 
full integration into the curriculum (41). Thus, educa-
tion about the Other seeks to encourage both empathy 
and the acceptance of the Other as “normal;” its addi-
tional strength is that it is directed at all members of a 
diverse classroom, not just the oppressed (41-42). How-
ever, as Kumashiro explains, providing information on 
the Other can become a “dominant narrative,” in which 
the experiences of a particular group are understood in 
a singular way as the experience of all members of that 
group. This approach also requires using “the Other as 
the expert,” as marginalised students are asked and ex-
pected to speak on behalf of an entire group (42). Both 
of these practices, he argues, can help to reinforce di-
visions between “us” and “them.” Education about the 
Other also does not recognise that knowledge is always 
situated and that, in practice, it is impossible  to teach 
students everything about everyone (42). Kumashiro 
recognises that this approach, like education for the 
Other, does not sufficiently consider the ways in which 
privileging is as important as Othering in the formation 
and maintenance of oppression.  
 Despite its lack of overt engagement with privi-
lege, education about the Other might be most attuned 
to privilege as having, since teaching about the Other 
could peripherally raise questions about advantages 
that the Others in question do not have. Yet, this is de-
cidedly not its focus. Privilege as being is even less of a 
consideration in education about the Other than it is 
in education for the Other. Given that the Other must 
be identified to be studied, questions about identity are 
a significant component of education for the Other; 
however, there is a danger that such education would 
identify the Other in terms of particular characteristics 
that are understood to be inherent and not in terms of 
constructed identities based on the oppression of some 
and the privileging of others.  
Education that is Critical of Privileging and Othering
 Education that is critical of privileging and 
Othering suggests that radical educators should pro-
vide “not knowledge about the other, but knowledge 
about oppression,” and that they should “teach a criti-
cal awareness of oppressive structures and ideologies, 
and strategies to change them” (Kumashiro 2002, 45). 
Kumashiro associates this approach with the conscious-
ness-raising strategies advanced by Paulo Freire and 
some feminist educators, in that it advocates for “un-
learning or critiquing what was previously learned to 
be ‘normal’ and normative” (46). One of its strengths, 
in Kumashiro’s view, is that educators are called on not 
just to change the attitudes of or create opportunities for 
individual students, but also to teach students to think 
critically about themselves and the social world (47). It 
also calls on students to understand their own complic-
ity in systems of oppression (47). Because of the struc-
tural focus of this approach, however, the different ways 
in which people experience oppression, even though 
they may be members of the same identifiable group, 
can become obscured (47). Education that is critical of 
privileging and Othering also assumes that knowledge 
about  oppression will lead to student action against it, 
without necessarily assessing the relationship between 
knowledge and action (48). Finally, Kumashiro iden-
tifies this approach as vulnerable to the pitfalls of the 
modernist tradition, as “consciousness-raising assumes 
that reason and reason alone leads to understanding,” 
even though the ideal of “rational detachment” serves 
to “perpetuate a mythical norm that assumes a White, 
heterosexual, male perspective” (49).
 Moving beyond the individualistic limitations 
of the first two approaches, education that is critical of 
privileging and Othering is more likely to address priv-
ilege, as it recognises that oppression consists not only 
of the denigration of some, but also of the elevation and 
privileging of others. This approach has strong ties to 
the lens of privilege as being. Howard’s (2008) work, 
which is consistent with privilege as being, suggests that 
privileged identities are not pre-existing and must be 
formed through interactive processes. However, seeing 
privilege as something that one is and something that is 
part of one’s identity suggests a fairly fixed, systemic ap-
proach to identity that is recognisable across contexts. 
Thus a systemic approach to oppression can accommo-
date a systemic approach to privilege. Kumashiro (2002) 
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critiques the third approach for its structural under-
standing of oppression, which he argues insufficiently 
grapples with the “contradictions” and “diversity and 
particularity” associated with multiple identities (47). 
As such, it likely contains a similarly structural, and 
therefore less situated and multifaceted, understanding 
of privilege. Given this somewhat fixed approach, edu-
cation that is critical of privileging and Othering is per-
haps more apt than other approaches to encourage stu-
dent awareness of the role of privilege in oppression. It 
is possible to say something substantial about privilege 
within an approach that can generalise across structures 
and systems. Yet structural approaches can lead to static 
understandings of both oppression and privilege, and it 
might be tempting to presume that we, as educators, can 
predict the effects of privilege in our classrooms based 
on students’ identities alone. This is an important dan-
ger of seeing privilege as being and only as being.
 Education that is critical of privileging and Oth-
ering also has important affinities with seeing privilege 
as having. Pedagogies in the consciousness-raising tra-
dition often explicitly aim to empower those taught 
(Kumashiro 2002, 46). As Gore (2003) notes, the no-
tion of empowerment generally presumes “a notion of 
power as property” (333). If power is seen as property, 
privilege is likely to be seen in similarly discrete terms 
and perhaps as something that can be given through 
empowerment. Thus privilege can be seen as something 
one is or something one has in this approach. 
Education that Changes Students and Society
 Kumashiro’s (2002) main focus is on his fourth 
approach, “education that changes students and society” 
(31), which uses “poststructuralist theories of discourse” 
(50). It is based in queer and feminist approaches to 
psychoanalytic theory and poststructuralism, and em-
phasises the importance of recognising partiality in the 
classroom and the resistance of students to learning that 
contests their own understandings of themselves; it also 
stresses the need to give students opportunities to work 
through various crises generated by challenges to their 
worldview and sense of self (53-68). A major strength of 
this approach is that it acknowledges the situated, shift-
ing workings of oppression and identity (53) and thus, 
it does not attempt to create an educational model to be 
applied in all cases (68). Another strength is that it prob-
lematises oppression itself and asks educators and theo-
rists to be explicit about how their understandings delin-
eate what is considered and what is not, and with what 
effects (68-69). Kumashiro does, however, recognise that 
poststructuralism and psychoanalysis have grown out of 
Western thought, perspectives, and experiences (69). As 
such, they are not neutral and do not account for the 
concerns of other epistemological traditions (69).  
 This approach to anti-oppression education ad-
dresses privilege in decidedly different ways than the 
others. Not surprisingly, education that changes stu-
dents and society understands privilege largely as Ku-
mashiro does: as something that one must constantly 
work to create in varied, situated contexts. In this in-
stance, the educational goal is that students come to 
comprehend themselves in new ways, particularly 
through the “paradoxical, discomforting condition” of 
crisis that necessarily accompanies the process of un-
learning oppressive knowledges (Kumashiro 2002, 63). 
It also asks students to consider how different ways of 
“reading” various stories and texts and one’s “investment 
in privilege” shapes one’s own understandings of the les-
sons learned (151). As such, Kumashiro draws attention 
to how certain ways of thinking are discursively priv-
ileged over others, and seeks to challenge and trouble 
privileged views and understandings.
 Predictably, then, education that changes stu-
dents and society shares a significant limitation with the 
lens of privilege as doing: there is a degree to which both 
actually do not allow one to say much that is definitive 
about privilege at all. Both are, on the one hand, acutely 
aware of privilege within the realm of discourse. On the 
other, given their refusal to universalise, they cannot 
comment on privilege across situations and contexts. 
Kumashiro’s fourth approach resists advocating for spe-
cific methods of teaching across classrooms or singu-
lar understandings of interactions or texts. Kumashiro 
(2002) argues that “those who propose antioppressive 
approaches need to refuse to speak as the authoritative 
voice” and should “enact different antioppressive forms 
of education while troubling those very forms” (202). 
This approach, then, might suggest ways of challenging 
privileged readings of a particular classroom or inter-
esting ways of reading privilege in different classrooms, 
but it does not allow for generalizable theoretical pre-
scriptions to combat privilege.
 Education that changes students and society re-
lies significantly on privilege as doing in its use of the 
concept of resistance. As Kumashiro (2002) explains, 
“[w]e resist learning what will disrupt the frameworks 
we traditionally use to make sense of the world and our-
selves” (57).  Such resistance can be a significant barrier 
to anti-oppression education efforts (57) and itself can 
be a way of doing privilege. Effective implementation of 
poststructuralist anti-oppression education approaches 
requires a great deal of thought about the ways in which 
persons in privileged situations and with privileged 
identities might grapple with this sort of crisis in situat-
ed moments and how it contributes to their resistance 
or openness to critical learning. 
 Privilege as being, perhaps appropriately, has a 
contradictory relationship with education that changes 
students and society. On the one hand, privilege as an 
identity implies stability that is not consistent with this 
approach’s insistence on fluid, constantly constructed 
meanings or its refusal to generalise across cases. On the 
other hand, privilege as being could recognise that priv-
ileged identities are constructed by various everyday in-
teractions that reinforce them and, in this way, privilege 
as being can be tied, albeit more loosely, with a post-
structuralist approach to anti-oppression education.    
 It is clear, then, that the three lenses of having, 
being, and doing privilege are applicable to both the 
practical classroom goals of anti-oppression educators 
and to the theories of oppression upon which those 
goals rely. 
Three Lenses of Privilege in Two Women’s Studies 
Classrooms
 Considering the three lenses through which we 
can view privilege and the connections I have drawn 
to various kinds of anti-oppression classroom prac-
tice, I now return to the two Women’s Studies cours-
es discussed above. Bryson and de Castell’s (1993) and 
Bacon’s (2006) different observations and conclusions 
about privilege in their classes can be further illumi-
nated by exploring what lenses of privilege were em-
bedded in their assessments and by considering them 
in light of their specific pedagogical goals.
 Both sets of authors were explicit about their 
desire to enact queer pedagogies against more essen-
tialising or structurally fixed ideas about identity and 
oppression. They were largely working toward educa-
tion that changes students and society. After all, Ku-
mashiro’s fourth approach is based in queer theory, 
which seeks to destabilise categories that reinforce op-
pression. While elements of the three other approaches 
to anti-oppression education can be detected in their 
analyses, the fourth appeared to be their explicit aim 
and we are left with the impression that they wished 
to queer their classrooms. Given this commitment, we 
might expect that the instructors would have embraced 
a situated and shifting understanding of privilege and 
approached privilege primarily or exclusively as some-
thing one does. However, their pedagogical methods 
were much more mixed.
 Bacon’s (2006) analysis implies the use of all 
three lenses of privilege. From one angle, she might 
have seen privilege as something one has. She de-
scribed the privilege of her heterosexually-identified 
students as a resource that allowed them to abandon 
with some gusto the commitment to a discrete category 
of lesbian. This is evident in her statement that, “Our 
students want to be normal, too, because it is a measure 
of privilege to be able to shun the normal - to queer 
the categories of our lives for the delight of pushing 
our politics further than our bodies might readily go, 
and they are in the process of acquiring that privilege” 
(279). From another angle, Bacon might have seen 
privilege as something one is. She hinted, for example, 
at the ways in which some students had been socialised 
to understand themselves in privileged or marginalised 
terms based on their sexual identities and their subur-
ban Pennsylvanian upbringings (275), which speaks 
to the process through which privileged identities are 
created. From yet another angle, she might have seen 
privilege as something one does. Bacon described the 
upending of traditional arrangements of privilege in 
her classroom, which privileged homosexuality over 
heterosexuality (275). She said that her lesbian-identi-
fied students were looking for a place where they could 
develop their identity, see examples of others with that 
identity, and feel comfortable in that identity (276). 
This observation suggests that her lesbian-identified 
students understandably wanted to use her classroom 
space to do privilege in a rare case where they were af-
forded the opportunity.
 In contrast, Bryson and de Castell’s (1993) de-
scription of what occurred in their classroom was based 
on a more fixed and less situated idea of privilege, one 
much more in line with privilege as being. They often 
identified “white straight-identified women” (291) as 
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the students who were privileged in their classroom 
and emphasised the “continuous and inescapable sub-
text of white heterosexual dominance” (294). Their ex-
planations of the effect of privilege in their classroom 
relied heavily on identities formed outside the class-
room, suggesting privilege was something their stu-
dents experienced as being. 
 There is certainly room in Bryson and de Cas-
tell’s (1993) analysis for considering privilege as doing. 
They recounted, in some detail, the ways in which their 
privileged students acted to recreate privilege, either by 
refusing to situate their own experiences (294) or by 
choosing to write detached academic papers instead of 
engaging in the more subversive coursework options 
(292). The authors’ story, written differently, could pro-
vide an interesting and insightful account of how stu-
dents do privilege by performing it. In the end, howev-
er, Bryson and de Castell seemed to fall back on the idea 
that it could not be otherwise; one gets the sense that 
these students were doomed to repeat the excesses of 
privilege based on their training as privileged subjects. 
This is particularly evident in their conclusion that “les-
bianism…is always marginal, even in a lesbian studies 
course, and…lesbian identity is always fixed and stable, 
even in a course that explicitly critiques, challenges, de-
constructs ‘lesbian identity’” (294).
 I do not mean to suggest that Bryson and de Cas-
tell should have seen privilege differently. I would argue 
that we need all three conceptualisations of privilege, 
but I do not think we must use them all in all instances. 
The choice to look at privilege as being, as fairly static 
and predictable and as homogeneous across white het-
erosexual students, can be a strategic one. But, as femi-
nist educators, recognising that we have a choice about 
how we look at privilege means opening up the possibil-
ity of looking at privilege differently and asking different 
questions. At issue, then, is whether the choice to see 
privilege as being in this classroom setting was the most 
effective one, given the goals set out by the instructors.
 These two case studies might initially have 
seemed incommensurable, given that these teachers de-
scribed nearly opposite effects of privilege in their two 
Women’s Studies classrooms. However, the three lenses 
of privilege open up different questions and refocus at-
tention on our goals. Were Bryson and de Castell’s aims 
best served by seeing privilege as something one is? 
Might they have opened up more space to pursue their 
poststructuralist goals by trying to understand privilege 
as something one does and considering new strategies 
to challenge that doing? Might such an approach have 
helped them to reach their goal to analyse the “ten-
sions between post-structuralist theories of subjectivi-
ty and the political/pragmatic necessity of essentialist 
constructions of identity” (Bryson and de Castell 1993, 
285)? Similarly, might Bacon’s goals have been better 
served by focusing on one aspect of privilege, instead of 
all three, in her assessment of her classroom? Which of 
these might have helped her to support her LGBT stu-
dents in following her deconstructionist performance, 
and/or to challenge her straight students?
 By focusing on pedagogical goals and on the dif-
ferent options we have for thinking about privilege, we 
might ask the following kinds of questions about any of 
our classroom spaces: What should my goal(s) for this 
specific Women’s and Gender Studies classroom be? 
Given those goals, am I best served by thinking about 
privilege as having, being, or doing in this context? 
What is illuminated by thinking about privilege in this 
way? What is obscured? Am I really using only one of 
these lenses or are others imbedded in the way I think 
about and act on privilege? How do my assumptions 
about privilege affect the choices I make as a teacher? 
How might they affect the way I reflect on my teaching? 
These kinds of questions focus attention on our practice 
and on the choices we can and do make every day as ed-
ucators. They remind us that we are not simply trapped 
in classrooms where privilege is an obstacle to our aims; 
we can decide how we want to see it in a particular 
setting, given what it is we want to do. For the many 
feminist educators who are already working hard to ad-
dress privilege, thinking about privilege as something 
one has, something one is, and something one does can 
help us reflect on the choices we make in responding to 
oppression and privilege in classroom settings. 
Conclusion
 In our most despairing moments, as Bryson 
and de Castell (1993) found, privilege can seem to be 
an immovable and monolithic barrier to our best femi-
nist aims. In the classroom, privilege can be a stubborn 
and visible constraint, but we can also find concrete op-
portunities to disrupt or work through it. Being more 
explicit about what we mean by privilege and what our 
goals are for our classrooms can help us to see possibil-
ities and not just roadblocks. Seeing privilege as having, 
being, or doing can help us to do that.
 While these three lenses can be useful in a va-
riety of contexts, I focus here on the classroom because 
I believe it is one of the most important feminist spac-
es. It is also one of the most challenging spaces where 
we confront both expected and unexpected elements of 
privilege in our day-to-day work as feminist academics. 
It is my most fervent hope, then, that these three lenses 
can help to open new possibilities for how we see our 
classrooms and for reaching our goals within them. 
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